突发：全面限制中国芯片！重点针对：中芯国际、长江存储、长鑫存储！

2年前更新

10月7日，美国对向中国出售半导体和芯片制造设备发布了全面限制。

美国商务部标题：Commerce Implements New Export Controls on Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items to the People’s Republic of China (PRC)

根据美国商务部工业和安全局(BIS)，除非获得特别许可，否则将不再允许企业向中国供应先进的计算芯片、芯片制造设备和其他产品。

据了解，这些规定限制了美国出口用于驱动人工智能应用的称为图形处理单元的尖端芯片，并对用于中国超级计算机的芯片施加了广泛的限制。此外，规定还禁止制造用于制造先进逻辑和存储芯片的设备的美国公司在没有许可证的情况下向中国出售这些机器。

为中国制造符合规定的IC的半导体制造“设施”增加了新的许可证要求。中国实体拥有的设施的许可证将面临“拒绝推定”，跨国公司拥有的设施将根据具体情况决定。

相关阈值如下：

•16nm或14nm或以下非平面晶体管架构（即FinFET或GAAFET）的逻辑芯片；

•18nm半间距或更小的DRAM内存芯片；

•NAND闪存芯片，128层或更多。

有专家列出此三条分别针对中芯国际、长鑫存储、长江存储。

且美国商务部新规则限制美国人员在没有许可证的情况下，在中国境内的某些半导体制造“设施”支持集成电路的开发或生产;

同一天消息：北方华创、长江存储、先导先进、中科院化学所等31家企业被列入“未经证实”（UVL）清单！

《纽约时报》刊文：Biden Administration Clamps Down on China’s Access to Chip Technology

行业专家表示，许多依赖人工智能和先进算法的中国行业使用美国图形处理设备来增强这些能力，而美国图形处理单元现在将受到限制。这些公司包括从事自动驾驶和基因测序等技术的公司，以及人工智能公司SenseTime和ByteDance，后者是拥有TikTok的中国互联网公司。

纽约时报提及：预计对芯片制造设备销售的新限制也将限制中国本土芯片制造商的运营，包括中芯国际（Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp.）、长江存储（Yangzing Memory Technologies Co.）和长鑫存储（ChangXin Memory Technologies）。

专家们需要时间来评估这项复杂的法规，一些人警告说，其影响将取决于该政策的实施方式。对于大多数措施，商务部有权酌情授予公司继续向中国销售受限制产品的特殊许可证，尽管商务部表示，大多数将被拒绝。

另一项外国直接产品规则禁止向 28 家出于国家安全考虑被列入“实体名单”的中国公司发送使用美国技术在美国境外制造的更广泛的产品。

这些规定还限制美国公民帮助中国半导体产业发展到先进水平。

据纽约时报报道，技术专家表示，这些规则似乎实施了十年来最广泛的出口管制，类似于前特朗普政府对电信设备制造商华为的打压，但范围更广，因为它们影响到数十家中国公司。与特朗普政府的做法形成鲜明对比的是，这些规则似乎制定了一项更全面的政策，将停止向一系列中国科技公司出口技术，并切断中国自己生产先进芯片的新生能力。

英文全文（附机翻）

Commerce Implements New Export Controls on Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Manufacturing Items to the People’s Republic of China (PRC)

商务部对中国先进计算和半导体制造项目实施新的出口管制

Washington, D.C.—The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is implementing a series of targeted updates to its export controls as part of BIS’s ongoing efforts to protect U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. These updates will restrict the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) ability to both purchase and manufacture certain high-end chips used in military applications and build on prior policies, company-specific actions, and less public regulatory, legal, and enforcement actions taken by BIS.

华盛顿特区——商务部工业和安全局（BIS）正在对其出口管制进行一系列有针对性的更新，作为BIS保护美国国家安全和外交政策利益的持续努力的一部分。这些更新将限制中华人民共和国（PRC）购买和制造用于军事应用的某些高端芯片的能力，并以BIS之前的政策、公司特定行动和较少的公共监管、法律和执法行动为基础。

The export controls announced in the two rules today restrict the PRC’s ability to obtain advanced computing chips, develop and maintain supercomputers, and manufacture advanced semiconductors. These items and capabilities are used by the PRC to produce advanced military systems including weapons of mass destruction; improve the speed and accuracy of its military decision making, planning, and logistics, as well as of its autonomous military systems; and commit human rights abuses. Finally, these rules make clear that foreign government actions that prevent BIS from making compliance determinations will impact a company’s access to U.S. technology through addition to the Entity List.

这两项规则今天宣布的出口管制限制了中国获取先进计算芯片、开发和维护超级计算机以及制造先进半导体的能力。这些项目和能力被中华人民共和国用于生产包括大规模毁灭性武器在内的先进军事系统；提高军事决策、规划和后勤以及自主军事系统的速度和准确性；侵犯人权。最后，这些规则明确指出，外国政府阻止BIS作出合规性决定的行为将影响公司通过加入实体名单获得美国技术。

“As I told Congress in July, my north star at BIS is to ensure that we are appropriately doing everything in our power to protect our national security and prevent sensitive technologies with military applications from being acquired by the People’s Republic of China’s military, intelligence, and security services,” said Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security Alan Estevez. “The threat environment is always changing, and we are updating our policies today to make sure we’re addressing the challenges posed by the PRC while we continue our outreach and coordination with allies and partners.”

“正如我在7月份告诉国会的那样，我在国际清算银行的北极星是确保我们在力所能及的范围内采取一切适当措施，保护国家安全，防止中华人民共和国军事、情报和安全部门获取具有军事应用的敏感技术，”负责工业和安全事务的商务部副部长艾伦说埃斯特韦斯。“威胁环境总是在变化，我们今天正在更新我们的政策，以确保我们在继续与盟友和合作伙伴进行联系和协调的同时，应对中国带来的挑战。”

“The PRC has poured resources into developing supercomputing capabilities and seeks to become a world leader in artificial intelligence by 2030. It is using these capabilities to monitor, track, and surveil their own citizens, and fuel its military modernization,” said Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration Thea D. Rozman Kendler. “Our actions will protect U.S. national security and foreign policy interests while also sending a clear message that U.S.technological leadership is about values as well as innovation.”

出口管理局助理商务部长西亚·罗兹曼·肯德勒（Thea D.Rozman Kendler）表示：“中华人民共和国已投入大量资源开发超级计算能力，并力争到2030年成为人工智能领域的世界领先者。它正在利用这些能力监测、跟踪和监视本国公民，并推动其军事现代化。”。“我们的行动将保护美国的国家安全和外交政策利益，同时也发出一个明确的信息，即美国的技术领导力关乎价值观和创新。”

“BIS’s ability to determine whether a party is in compliance with our export control rules is a core tenet of our enforcement program,” said Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Enforcement Matthew S. Axelrod. “Where BIS is prevented by a host government from conducting our end–use checks in a timely manner, we will add parties to the Unverified List, and if the delay is extreme enough, the Entity List, to prevent the risk of diversion of any U.S. technology that could undermine our national security interests.”

负责出口执法的商务部助理部长马修·阿克塞尔罗德（Matthew s.Axelrod）表示：“国际清算银行判断一方是否遵守我们的出口管制规则的能力是我们执法计划的核心原则。”。“如果东道国政府阻止BIS及时进行我们的最终用途检查，我们将把各方添加到未经验证的名单中，如果延迟严重，则添加到实体名单中，以防止任何可能损害我们国家安全利益的美国技术被转移的风险。”

The Department of Commerce briefed and consulted with close allies and partners on these controls. The Department will work closely with industry as we implement all elements of the Administration’s semiconductor agenda, to include ensuring compliance with these measures.

商务部简要介绍了这些控制措施，并与密切的盟友和合作伙伴进行了磋商。在我们执行政府半导体议程的所有要素时，国防部将与工业界密切合作，包括确保遵守这些措施。

Summaries of the rules released today and relevant links to the rule text are provided below, along with additional background on BIS’s ongoing work to update its approach to export controls related to the PRC.

下文提供了今天发布的规则摘要和规则文本的相关链接，以及国际清算银行正在进行的工作的其他背景，以更新其与中国相关的出口管制方法。

Implementing ControlsRelated toAdvanced Computingand Semiconductor Manufacturing:

BIS’s rule on advanced computing and semiconductor manufacturing addresses U.S. national security and foreign policy concerns in two key areas. First, the rule imposes restrictive export controls on certain advanced computing semiconductor chips, transactions for supercomputer end–uses, and transactions involving certain entities on the Entity List. Second, the rule imposes new controls on certain semiconductor manufacturing items and on transactions for certain integrated circuit (IC) end uses.

实施与先进计算和半导体制造相关的控制：

国际清算银行关于先进计算和半导体制造的规定在两个关键领域解决了美国的国家安全和外交政策问题。首先，该规则对某些高级计算半导体芯片、超级计算机最终用途交易以及涉及实体列表上某些实体的交易实施限制性出口管制。其次，该规则对某些半导体制造项目和某些集成电路（IC）最终用途的交易实施了新的控制。

Specifically, the rule:

1.) Adds certain advanced and high–performance computing chips and computer commodities that contain such chips to the Commerce Control List (CCL);

2.) Adds new license requirements for items destined for a supercomputer or semiconductor development or production end use in the PRC;

3.) Expands the scope of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) over certain foreign produced advanced computing items and foreign produced items for supercomputer end uses;

4.) Expands the scope of foreign-produced items subject to license requirements to twenty–eight existing entities on the Entity List that are located in the PRC;

5.) Adds certain semiconductor manufacturing equipment and related items to the CCL;

6.) Adds new license requirements for items destined to a semiconductor fabrication “facility” in the PRC that fabricates ICs meeting specified. Licenses for facilities owned by PRC entities will face a “presumption of denial,” and facilities owned bymultinationals will be decided on a case–by–case basis.

The relevant thresholds are as follows:

• Logic chips with non–planar transistor architectures (I.e., FinFET or GAAFET) of 16nm or 14nm, or below;

• DRAM memory chips of 18nm half-pitch or less;

• NAND flash memory chips with 128 layers or more.

7.) Restricts the ability of U.S. persons to support the development, or production, of ICs at certain PRC–located semiconductor fabrication “facilities” without a license;

8.) Adds new license requirements to export items to develop or produce semiconductor manufacturing equipment and related items; and

9.) Establishes a Temporary General License (TGL) to minimize the short-term impact on the semiconductor supply chain by allowing specific, limited manufacturing activities related to items destined for use outside the PRC.